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Articles
Metalclad v. United Mexican States
Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA's
Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim
Process
Chris Tollefson"
This is a groundbreaking decision in international law that will be
cited frequently as it is the first case ever, to our knowledge, where a
host state has been found to breach its duty of 'fair and equitable'
treatment.
Dr. Jack J. Coe Jr., co-counsel for Metalclad, on the arbitral award1
This case highlights how an international trade agreement like
NAFTA threatens democracy.
Judy Darcy, President of the Canadian Union of Public Employees
(CUPE) on the eve of CUPE's application to intervene in the judicial
review of the arbitral award 2
INTRODUCTION
No arbitral decision under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), indeed few arbitral decisions of any kind,
* Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I am grateful for the research assistance
provided by Peter McPherson (UVic Law, 2001) during the summer of 2001, and for
the editorial assistance of Susen Johnson (UVic Law, class of 2005) as this article
proceeded through the publication process. I am also grateful to Cecil Branson Q.C.
for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. Petitioner's Reply 72 at 20, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp.,
[2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.) (No. L002904).
2. Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
223, 223 (2001).
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have garnered attention rivaling that rendered in the matter of
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States.3 The NAFTA
tribunal's ("the Tribunal") decision in this case marks the first
time that an investor has successfully sued a host state under
the controversial investor-state claim procedures contained in
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA. But the political salience and
legal significance of the decision go much further.
The decision arose out of a dispute between Metalclad, an
American-based corporation, and the Mexican municipality of
Guadalcazar ("Municipality") over issuing a permit for a haz-
ardous waste treatment facility.4 Although Metalclad had se-
cured state and federal approval to operate the facility, the Mu-
nicipality steadfastly refused to issue a building permit for the
facility, citing environmental concerns and community opposi-
tion.5 Ultimately, Metalclad sued the State of Mexico under the
investor-state claim provisions of Chapter Eleven of NAFTA and
was awarded compensation in the amount of $16.685 million. 6
The Tribunal's ruling was greeted with a flurry of media at-
tention and political commentary, most of it negative and de-
picting the outcome as a foreboding illustration of the implica-
tions of free trade and globalization for local governance and
environmental regulation.' Critics invoked the decision as evi-
dence that NAFTA, and in particular Chapter Eleven, repre-
sented the triumph of international trade law over domestic
law.8 The case, it was said, revealed the Chapter's potential as
an "offensive strategic tool" in the hands of foreign investors;9
allowing them privileged access to and influence within the do-
mestic policy making sphere, and creating formidable new con-
straints on the ability of governments to balance public and pri-
vate interests. 10 These impacts, it was predicted, would be most
3. Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID REV-FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 168 (2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Award].
4. Id. 2 at 171-72.
5. Id. 78-79 at 190, 92 at 193.
6. See generally Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement
and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican
States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 214-59 (2001) (explaining the historical
background to the litigation).
7. Id. at 213.
8. Danielle Knight, Mexico Ordered To Pay U.S. Company $17 Million, INTER
PRESS SERV. (August 31, 2001), available at http//www.igc.org/globalpolicy/
socecon/enbronmt/nafta.htm, cited in Dhooge, supra note 6, at 274.
9. Id.
10. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE
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profound in the realms of environmental protection and public
health, where governments at all levels would be deterred from
taking decisive and precautionary steps to protect the public in-
terest." The ruling was also characterized as a direct attack on
the right of municipal governments to make decisions on devel-
opment proposals that conflicted with local priorities and con-
cerns.12
Unified by their opposition to the Tribunal's decision, a
broad coalition of civil society organizations and local govern-
ments mobilized.' 3 They demanded that Chapter Eleven be re-
negotiated or, at the very least, clarified to recognize the right of
governments to regulate in the public interest and to ensure
greater public participation and transparency in the arbitral
process. 14
The decision also provoked considerable attention from le-
gal commentators. 15 In holding for Metalclad, the Tribunal
broke controversial new ground in two key respects. First, it in-
terpreted Article 1105 to impose a new duty on NAFTA host
governments to ensure that all internal public decision-making
processes that may affect foreign investors are fully transparent
and certain.1 6 Second, it adopted a definition of compensable
taking for the purposes of Article 1110 that is much broader
than most observers believe prevails under customary interna-
tional law,'7 and in a manner with which Canada and Mexico
have expressed strong disagreement. 8
For these reasons, Mexico's attempt to have the decision ju-
dicially set aside was followed with much anticipation and in-
terest. The application was filed in the British Columbia (B.C.)
Supreme Court, the jurisdiction where the arbitration was
ENVIRONMENT 15 (Int'l Inst. For Sustainable Dev., Working Paper, 1999), at
http://www.iisdl.iisd.ca/trade/chapter 11.htm.
11. Dhooge, supra note 6, at 273-74.
12. Id. at 277-78.
13. For example, the Council of Canadians, Public Citizen, Greenpeace, the Si-
erra Club of Canada and the World Wildlife Fund. See sources cited in Dhooge, su-
pra note 6, at 213 n.31, 214 nn.34-35, 276 n.512, 277 n.520, & 282 n.555.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Dhooge, supra note 6, at 209; Ian Jack, Mexico First Partner to
Lose NAFTA Case, FIN. POST, Sept. 1, 2000, at http://www.google.coml
search?q=cache:205...tlmexico.html.
16. Award, supra note 3, T 76 at 190.
17. Id. at T 102-112 at 195-96.
18. See Respondent's Outline of Argument at 2, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.) (No. L002904); Petitioner's Outline
of Argument at 3, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d
359 (Can.) (No. L002904).
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
deemed to have taken place under the applicable arbitral
rules.19 Given the public interest in this first judicial review of a
Chapter 11 tribunal decision, Mr. Justice Tysoe gave permission
for the proceeding to be broadcast live on the Internet, a first for
media-shy Canadian courts. He also granted intervenor status
to the Governments of Canada and the Province of Quebec,
while rejecting a similar application brought on behalf of a na-
tional Canadian public sector union.20
Justice Tysoe's decision, rendered May 2, 2001, allowed
both Mexico and Metalclad to claim a significant measure of
success.21 On the one hand, his decision unequivocally overruled
the Tribunal's conclusion that Mexico was under a duty of
transparency under Article 1105 of NAFTA.2 2 At the same time,
however, he was not prepared to disturb what he termed the
Tribunal's "exceedingly broad" definition of expropriation for the
purposes of Article 1110.23
Shortly after Justice Tysoe's decision was rendered, with
public scrutiny and debate over Chapter Eleven continuing to
mount, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission took the unprece-
dented step of issuing a joint interpretive statement aimed at
clarifying key aspects of the process for the purposes of future
arbitrations. 4 This statement effectively endorsed two key as-
pects of Justice Tysoe's ruling with respect to the ambit of Arti-
cle 1105.25 It also committed the NAFTA Parties to taking
greater steps to share documents filed in connection with Chap-
ter Eleven proceedings with members of the public and other
levels of government, in the hope that, as the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative put it, "sunshine [will] overcome some of [the] fears
and concerns" created by the procedure. 26
19. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.).
20. Petitioner's Reply 39 at 11, United Mexican States v. Matalclad Corp.,
[2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.) (No. L002904).
21. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d at 359.
22. Id. at 380.
23. Id. at 382-83.
24. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chap-
ter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp, [hereinafter Interpretive Statement].
25. The statement, discussed infra pp. 130-31, supports Justice Tysoe's ruling
in two respects. First, it confirms that Article 1105(1) does not "require treatment
in addition to, or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment." Interpretive Statement, supra note 24, at § B(2).
Secondly, it confirms that "a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a sepa-
rate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Ar-
ticle 1105(1)." Id. at § B(3).
26. Jeff Sallot & Heather Scoffield, Agreement Means More Open NAFTA,
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Using Justice Tysoe's judgment as a point of departure to
reflect on the interpretive future of Chapter Eleven, this article
is divided into six parts. Part I discusses the complex factual
and legal history of the dispute leading up to Mexico's applica-
tion to have the Tribunal's decision set aside in the B.C. Su-
preme Court. Part II considers the nature and basis of judicial
jurisdiction to review awards under Chapter Eleven. Part III
examines what standard of review courts should apply to peti-
tions of this kind. Part IV considers the scope and meaning of
international minimum standards of treatment, a key basis on
which the Tribunal held that Mexico was liable for having
breached its obligations under Chapter Eleven. Part V considers
the other basis upon which the Tribunal held Mexico liable un-
der Chapter Eleven: its controversial and uncertain provisions
relating to expropriation. The article concludes in Part VI with
some observations on the rationale and implications of the ap-
proach adopted by Justice Tysoe in reviewing the Tribunal's
award, giving particular attention to the questions his judgment
does not resolve; questions that will undoubtedly preoccupy tri-
bunals and courts called upon to adjudicate future claims
emerging from this unique, high profile, international dispute
resolution procedure.
I. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
A. THE FACTS
The dispute in this case centered on a proposal to build a
hazardous waste disposal landfill in La Pedrera, a remote com-
munity located within the municipality of Guadalcazar, in the
State of San Luis Potosi (SLP).27 The landfill operation was
owned at all relevant times by Confinamiento Tecnico de Resi-
dous Industriales, S.A. de C.V. (COTERIN), a company incorpo-
rated under the laws of Mexico.2s
The Municipality is located in a sparsely populated, highly
impoverished region of Central Mexico. Its climate is hot and
arid, the flora and fauna characteristic of a desert.29 There is
little commercial activity; local inhabitants subsist through
GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 1, 2001, at B1-2.
27. Award, supra note 3, % 28 at 179.
28. Petitioner's Outline of Argument T] 8 at 2, Metalclad (No. L002904).
29. Id. 1 323 at 101.
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ranching and small scale, communal agricultural production.30
Much of the Municipality lacks running water.31 Since the
Municipality has no taxing authority and is wholly reliant on
state and federal appropriations, there are virtually no public
services.3 2  The Municipal government's only phone-line is
shared with a public payphone; it has one station wagon, a jail
and two peace officers.33
1. COTERIN's Attempts to Secure a Landfill Permit
In 1990, COTERIN received federal approval to open a haz-
ardous waste transfer station in La Pedrera.34 It soon came to
light that COTERIN, rather than storing and transferring the
waste as it was authorized to do, was disposing of untreated
waste onsite. The illegal dumping of approximately 20,000 tons
of such waste3 5 provoked vociferous local opposition and led to
complaints to the National Human Rights Commission and nu-
merous federal investigations.36  In September 1991, after
eleven months of illegal dumping, the federal government or-
dered the Transfer Station to be closed and sealed the entrance
to the site.37
In 1991, and again in 1992, the Municipality turned down
applications by COTERIN to expand its La Pedrera operation by
constructing a hazardous waste landfill ("Landfill") citing com-
munity opposition and the company's failure to remedy existing
on-site contamination. 38 Despite these refusals, COTERIN con-
tinued to pursue its plans to build the Landfill.39 In 1993, it re-
ceived environmental impact authorization and later a landfill-
operating permit from SEMARNAP (the federal secretariat for
environmental and natural resources)40 as well as a state land
30. Id. Ranching and farming activities are carried out by members of ejidos, a
form of communal land-holding established following the Mexican Revolution of
1910. Id.
31. Id. 324 at 101.
32. Id. 326 at 102.
33. Id. 324 at 101, 327 at 102.
34. Award, supra note 3, J 28 at 179.
35. It is alleged that the quantity of waste involved exceeded that spilled in the
famous Love Canal case. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 331 at 103, Metalclad
(No. L002904).
36. Id.
37. Id. 332 at 103.
38. Id. 13 at 3, 22 at 4.
39. Id. IT 16-20 at 4.
40. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 12 at 3, Metalclad (No. L002904). It ob-
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use permit. 41
While COTERIN was in the process of securing these state
and federal permits, it was also negotiating an option agreement
with Metalclad Corporation ("Metalclad"). 42 Under this agree-
ment, concluded in April 1993, Metalclad gained the right to
purchase COTERIN. 43 The agreement was conditioned on
COTERIN securing a Municipal construction permit for the
Landfill or, alternatively, obtaining a definitive judgment from
the Mexican courts that such permit was not legally required. 44
In September 1993, Metalclad exercised its option and com-
pleted its purchase, without either of these conditions being
met, in reliance on assurances from the federal government that
all necessary permits were issued or would be forthcoming.45
Construction of the Landfill commenced in April 1994. In
October 1994, the Municipality ordered construction activity to
be halted on the ground that COTERIN did not have a munici-
pal construction permit.46 COTERIN immediately re-applied for
a municipal construction permit and carried on with construc-
tion, which it completed in March 1995. 47 When COTERIN tried
to "inaugurate" the Landfill later that month, demonstrators
blocked the entrance, dispersing several hours later.48
Meanwhile, Metalclad was in negotiations with
SEMARNAP and, in November 1995, entered into an agreement
(the "Convenio").49 The Convenio authorized Metalclad to oper-
ate the Landfill for five years and required the company to per-
form site remediation work during the first three years of opera-
tion.50 It also required Metalclad to pay the Municipality two
pesos for every ton of hazardous waste received, and to employ
local residents to perform manual labor at the site.51 Neither
tained these in January 1993 and August 1993 respectively from the National Insti-
tute of Ecology (INE) an agency of the federal Secretariat of the Environment, Natu-
ral Resources and Fishing (SEMARNAP). Id. The State of San Luis Potosi granted
a land use permit in May 1993. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. 14 at 3.
43. Id. 15 at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 1 18 at 4, Metalclad (No. L002904).
47. Id. IT 19-20 at 4.
48. Award, supra note 3, 46 at 182; Petitioner's Outline of Argument 21 at
4, Metalclad (No. L002904).
49. Award, supra note 3, 47 at 182.
50. Id. 48 at 182.
51. Id. 49 at 182. The other terms contained in the Convenio included the
designation of thirty-four hectares of the site as a buffer zone for the conservation of
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the Municipality nor the State government were involved in ne-
gotiating the Convenio. 52
In December 1995, at a public meeting to which Metalclad
was not invited, the Municipality again rejected COTERIN's ap-
plication for a construction permit.53 It cited various reasons for
this decision including COTERIN's decision to proceed with con-
struction without a permit, its failure to remedy contamination
caused by operation of the Transfer Station, community opposi-
tion and the adverse environmental impacts associated with op-
eration of the Landfill.54
2. Commencement of Legal Proceedings
Shortly after making this decision, the Municipality also
filed an administrative complaint with SEMARNAP challenging
the Convenio. 55 When this was dismissed, it filed a writ of am-
paro in federal court challenging SEMARNAP's dismissal of its
complaint and seeking an interim injunction on the receipt of
new hazardous waste.56 In early 1996, the court granted the in-
junction.57
In May 1996, Metalclad commenced an amparo action of its
own challenging the Municipality's refusal to reconsider its ap-
plication for a construction permit.58 When this amparo appli-
cation was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Metalclad filed
an appeal that it soon abandoned in favor of direct negotiations
with the Municipality.5 9
In October 1996, Metalclad delivered a Notice of Intent to
endemic species and the requirement of the company to consult with government
authorities on the remediation of hazardous waste sites. It also required that the
company process hazardous waste generated in the State of San Luis Potosi at a
10% discount, provide free medical advice to residents of the Municipality one day
per week as well as provide two publicly-accessible courses annually regarding the
management of hazardous waste. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 30 at 6-7,
Metalclad (No. L002904).
52. Award, supra note 3, 31 at 7.
53. Id. 54-55 at 189, 91 at 193.
54. Id. 50 at 183; Petitioner's Outline of Argument 22 at 4-5, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
55. Award, supra note 3, 55 at 184; see also Petitioner's Outline of Argument
T 32 at 7, Metalclad (No. L002904).
56. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 34 at 7, Metalclad (No. L002904); see
also Award, supra note 3, 56 at 184.
57. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 35 at 7, Metalclad (No. L002904).
58. Id. 401 at 123.
59. Id. 23 at 5.
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Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Article 1119 of NAFTA.
60
Arbitral proceedings against Mexico were formally commenced
in January 1997.
In September 1997, while the arbitration was underway,
the Governor of SLP issued an ecological decree ("Ecological De-
cree"). The Ecological Decree covered 188,758 hectares and en-
compassed the 814 hectares covered by the Landfill site.6' An
express purpose of the Ecological Decree was to protect endan-
gered cacti species, which studies suggested were found in
world-high concentrations within the Municipality.62 The Eco-
logical Decree preserved existing permits or authorizations
granted prior to its enactment, and it permitted the establish-
ment of new businesses so long as the sustainability of natural
resources was ensured and there was compliance with all other
applicable laws and regulations. 63 Nonetheless, the Tribunal
found that the "ecological decree had the effect of barring for-
ever the operation of the landfill."6 4
B. ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE AWARD
1. Convening the Tribunal
Article 1120 of NAFTA provides that investor claimants
may seek relief under one of three sets of arbitral rules: (1) the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Rules; (2) the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or (3)
the United Nations Centre for International Trade Law Rules
("UNCITRAL Rules").65 Metalclad elected to proceed under the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, whereupon a tribunal ("Tribu-
nal") was convened to hear its claims.66 It consisted of former
U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, Jose Luis
Siqueiros, a Mexican international law jurist, and Chairman
Elihu Lauterpacht, an English international law professor.
67
60. Id. 49 at 12; see also Award, supra note 3, 7 at 173.
61. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 434 at 132, Metalclad (No. L002904).
62. Id. T 430 at 131.
63. Id. TT 431 & 433 at 132.
64. Award, supra note 3, T 109 at 196.
65. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1120, 32 I.L.M. 296, 643 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also Petitioner's Outline of
Argument 91 110 at 30, Metalclad (No. L002904).
66. Award, supra note 3, T1 8 at 173; see also Petitioner's Outline of Argument I
111 at 30, Metalclad (No. L002904).
67. Respondent's Outline of Argument T 22 at 6, Metalclad (No. L002904).
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The Tribunal designated the City of Vancouver, British Colum-
bia, as the site of the arbitration. 68
Metalclad alleged six separate NAFTA Chapter Eleven vio-
lations. 69 Of these, its key claims were that Mexico had violated
its obligation to accord Metalclad "treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security" under Article 1105 and that Mexico
had expropriated its investments contrary to Article 1110. 70
2. The Tribunal's Ruling
On August 25, 2000, after receiving submissions from the
Parties as well as from the Governments of Canada and the
United States, the Tribunal issued its ruling.71 As a threshold
issue, the Tribunal decided that Mexico was internationally re-
sponsible for the actions of its state and local governments. This
conclusion, it held, was consistent with language elsewhere in
NAFTA 72 , with customary international law, 73 and had, in any
event, been conceded by Mexico in pre-hearing submissions. 74
The Tribunal then considered Metalclad's allegation that
Mexico had violated Article 1105. 75 In defining the scope and
68. Award, supra note 3, 11 at 174.
69. In addition to its claims under Articles 1105 and 1110 that are discussed
infra Part I(B)(2), Metalclad contended that Mexico had failed to accord it "national
treatment" under Article 1102 due to the Municipality's selective and discriminatory
imposition of a construction permitting requirement; that the imposition of license,
permit, testing and study requirements violated Mexico's obligations under Articles
1103 and 1104 (most favored nation treatment); and that Mexico had imposed per-
formance obligations in violation of Article 1106 by requiring Metalclad to provide
safety manuals, design specifications and other information in connection with the
permitting process and by soliciting various social service commitments (such as free
medical care, potable water and education funding) in return for allowing the project
to proceed. For a detailed discussion see Dhooge, supra note 6, at 242-47.
70. Award, supra note 3, 72 at 189.
71. Id. at 168.
72. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 201(2), 32 I.L.M. at 289, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at
639.
73. See, for instance, Article 10 of the draft articles on state responsibility
adopted by the International Law Commission of the U.N. in 1975, cited in Award,
supra note 3, 70 at 188).
74. In its post-hearing submissions, Mexico stated that it does not "plead that
the acts of the Municipality were not covered by NAFTA. [Mexico] was, and re-
mains, prepared to proceed on the assumption that the normal rule of state respon-
sibility applies; that is, that the Respondent can be internationally responsible for
the acts of state organs at all three levels of government." Award, supra note 3, 73
at 189.
75. Id. 74 at 190.
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nature of Mexico's obligations under Article 1105, it emphasized
that an "underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and in-
crease cross-border investment opportunities and to ensure the
successful implementation of investment initiatives."7 6 Drawing
on NAFTA's preamble and the language in Chapter Eighteen,
the Tribunal concluded that NAFTA imposed broad "transpar-
ency obligations" on the Parties to ensure that all legal require-
ments applicable to investments made under the Agreement are
"capable of being readily known to all affected investors."77 Ac-
cording to the Tribunal, if a Party is aware of the possibility of
misunderstanding or confusion with respect to the nature of
these requirements, it is obliged to ensure that the require-
ments are promptly determined and clarified for the investor's
benefit.78 In the Tribunal's view, transparency obligations were
a core component of the duty to ensure that investors receive in-
ternational minimum standards of treatment as guaranteed un-
der Article 1105.79
Applying this approach, the Tribunal held that Mexico
breached its obligations under Article 1105 in two ways. The
first was Mexico's acquiescence in the "improper" refusal of the
Municipality to grant a construction permit for the Landfill.80
In this regard, after considering Mexican law (and preferring
the evidence of Metalclad's experts on Mexican law to those put
forward by Mexico), the Tribunal held that the Municipality
lacked legal authority to issue construction permits for hazard-
ous waste landfills, a jurisdiction it held was within the exclu-
sive purview of the federal government.81 Secondly, the Tribu-
nal held that even if the Municipality had authority to issue
such permits, it could not reject a permit application on the ba-
sis of environmental effects or impacts on surrounding commu-
nities;8 2 it could only do so based on concerns about the sound-
ness of the proposed construction.88
The Tribunal also held that the Mexican government "failed
to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metal-
76. Id. 75 at 190.
77. Id. 76 at 190.
78. Id.
79. Id. I 99-101 at 194.
80. Award, supra note 3, 86 at 192 (discussing how the Municipality's denial
of the permit was "improper").
81. Id. 105 at 193.
82. Id. T 106 at 195-96.
83. Id. 106 at 95-96, 93 at 193.
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clad's business planning and investment." 4 To this end, the Tri-
bunal relied on a variety of factors including representations
made by the federal government at the time of Metalclad's ini-
tial investment that a municipal permit was unnecessary, the
absence of clear rules as to whether municipal permits were re-
quired, the lack of established practices and procedures for han-
dling municipal permits, delays associated with processing
Metalclad's final permit application, the failure of the Munici-
pality to give Metalclad notice of the meeting at which its per-
mit application was considered, and legal actions taken by the
Municipality to enjoin operation of the landfill upon its comple-
tion.85
With respect to Article 1110, the Tribunal concluded that
the same actions underpinning its opinion that Mexico breached
Article 1105 led to the conclusion that Mexico also a breached
Article 1110.86 The relevant language of Article 1110 provides
that: "[no] party may directly or indirectly ... expropriate an
investment ... or take a measure tantamount to ... expropria-
tion ... except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law
and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation." T8 For
these purposes, "measure" is broadly defined to include "any
law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice. 88
The Tribunal defined "expropriation" under Article 1110 as
"not only open, deliberate and acknowledged taking of prop-
erty... but also covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or
in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected eco-
nomic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious
benefit of the host State. 89 It then proceeded to hold that Mex-
ico had violated Article 1110 in two ways. The first was by
"permitting or tolerating" the conduct of the Municipality in re-
lation to Metalclad (which the Tribunal had already held-with
respect to Article 1105-was unfair and inequitable treatment)
and by thus participating or acquiescing in denying Metalclad
the right to operate the landfill.90 This, it held, amounted to a
84. Id. 9 at 173.
85. Id. 88, 90, 91, & 94 at 192-93.
86. Award, supra note 3, 104 at 195.
87. Id. T 102 at 195 (quoting NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at
641).
88. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 201(1), 32 I.L.M. at 298.
89. Award, supra note 3, 103 at 195.
90. Id. 1 104 at 195.
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measure "tantamount to expropriation" contrary to Article
1110. 91 The Tribunal also held that Mexico had indirectly ex-
propriated Metalclad's investment contrary to Article 1110 due
to the unlawful action of the municipality and by the absence of
a timely, orderly, or substantive basis for the Municipality's de-
cision to deny the permit.92
Finally, although it considered it "not strictly necessary" to
dispose of the claim, the Tribunal identified the Ecological De-
cree enacted by SLP as further ground for a finding of expro-
priation. 93 In its view, this Ecological Decree had the effect of
barring forever the operation of the Landfill at the site.94 Char-
acterizing implementation of the Ecological Decree as "an act
tantamount to expropriation," it expressly refused to consider
"the motivation or intent" underlying its adoption. 95
According to the Tribunal, Mexico's breaches of Articles
1105 and 1110 led to a common result: "the complete frustration
of the operation of the landfill [negating] the possibility of any
meaningful return on Metalclad's investment. 9 6 Regardless of
the source of the breach, therefore, Metalclad had "completely
lost" its investment.97 The general rule regarding damages un-
der Chapter Eleven is that an investor receives compensation
based on the fair market value of the investment immediately
prior to the breach. 98 In this case, however, as the Landfill was
not a going concern, the Tribunal held that the measure of dam-
ages was Metalclad's actual investment in the project.99 Accord-
ingly, allowing for interest on the award and deducting site
remediation costs likely to be incurred by Mexico upon regaining
title to the property, the Tribunal awarded Metalclad $16.685
million.100
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mexico commenced an application for judicial review of the
91. Id.
92. Id. 107 at 195.
93. Id. 109 at 196.
94. Id.
95. Award, supra note 3, 111 at 197.
96. Id. 113 at 197.
97. Id.
98. Id. 118 at 198 (quoting NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at
641).
99. Id. T 122 at 199.
100. Id. 131 at 202.
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Tribunal's decision in October 2000.101 Under the ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Rules, which governed the arbitration, the appli-
cable law for purposes of this review was that of the jurisdiction
in which the award was made.102 Thus, Mexico petitioned the
British Columbia Supreme Court seeking an order setting aside
the award of the Tribunal. 10 3
Mexico sought review on two principal grounds: it alleged
first that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction and that it
had erred in its interpretation and application of Articles 1105
and 1110.104 First, it alleged that the Tribunal had exceeded its
jurisdiction, inter alia, by (a) imposing transparency obligations
that do not exist under Chapter Eleven and which were beyond
the agreed scope of the arbitration; (b) applying Articles 1105
and 1110 so as to equate a violation of domestic law with a vio-
lation of international law and, in the process, improperly acting
"as if it were a Mexican court of appeal;" (c) making patently un-
reasonable findings with regard to the relevant evidence; and (d)
failing to answer all of the questions presented for its resolution,
contrary to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 10 5
Mexico also submitted that the Tribunal had erred in law in
its characterization of the transparency-related duties of a Party
under Article 1105, and in its over-broad definition of "expro-
priation" applicable under Article 1105.106
The case was argued before Mr. Justice Tysoe over the
course of ten days in late February and early March 2001. His
decision was rendered on May 2, 2001.107 He later gave supple-
mentary reasons for his decision on October 31, 2001.108 The
particulars of, and reasoning supporting, his judgment will be
discussed shortly on a more detailed, thematic basis. As noted
101. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 1 at 1, Metalclad (No. L002904).
102. Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceed-
ings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, ICSID Doc. 11 (June 1979), available at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/facility/1.htm [hereinafter Additional Facility Rules]; see also Petitioner's
Outline of Argument 2 at 1, Metalclad (No. L002904).
103. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 45 at 10, 592 at 181, Metalclad (No.
L002904); Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 1 at 363-64.
104. Petitioner's Outline of Argument I 46-47 at 10-11, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
105. Id.
106. Id. 47 at 11.
107. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d at 359.
108. Supplementary Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Tysoe,
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.C.S.C. 1529, available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca.
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earlier, both sides were able to claim a measure of success in the
result.
Mexico was vindicated insofar as the decision set aside two
key legal findings made by the Tribunal: (1) that it had violated
its alleged transparency obligations under Article 1105; and (2)
that its actions prior to the issuance of the Ecological Decree
constituted a violation of Article 1110. In particular, Justice
Tysoe accepted Mexico's argument that the Tribunal had ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in deeming transparency obligations to
exist under Article 1110, and that this jurisdictional error had
"infected" its analysis of the Mexico's liability under Article 1105
prior to issuance of the Ecological Decree.109
Nonetheless, Justice Tysoe upheld the award to the extent
that it was based on the Tribunal's conclusion that the subse-
quent enactment and implementation of the Ecological Decree
amounted to an uncompensated expropriation contrary to Arti-
cle 1105. In his view, this was a finding of law that was beyond
his jurisdiction to overturn. 10 He also rejected Mexico's argu-
ments that the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to
Metalclad's "improper acts"1 and that the Tribunal had failed,
contrary to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, to answer the
questions it had been asked. 1 2 He ordered that Metalclad was
entitled to the bulk of its original award 13 and awarded it 75%
of the costs of the proceeding.114
In the Parts that follow, Justice Tysoe's resolution of the
specific issues before him are addressed as well as the implica-
tions for future judicial reviews of this kind.
109. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 78 at 381-82.
110. Id. 99 at 386.
111. Id. 118 at 390.
112. Id. 122 at 392, 130 at 394.
113. The difference between the Tribunal's award and the amount ordered pay-
able by Justice Tysoe was based on a reduction for interest payable. This reduction
is attributable to the difference between the Tribunal's designation of December 5,
1995 (the date when, it deemed, the first breaches of Chapter 11 occurred), and Jus-
tice Tysoe's designation of September 20, 1997 (the date on which the Ecological De-
cree was issued, which he held constituted Mexico's first violation of its Chapter
Eleven obligations). Id. 134-135 at 395-96.
114. In Canada, the general rule with respect to costs, in contrast to American
practice, is that costs "follow the event." In other words, the so-called "English rule"
of costs is applied under which the successful party is entitled to recover its legal
costs from its opponent based on a tariff system set out in the court rules. Where
success is divided, costs are allocated on a pro rata basis reflecting, among other
things, the degree of success enjoyed by the parties to the litigation. See M. ORKIN,
THE LAW OF CosTs 2-62 (1994).
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO
AWARDS UNDER CHAPTER ELEVEN
A. ICSID ADDITIONAL FACULTY RULES
As noted, when Metalclad commenced its Chapter Eleven
claim, it invoked the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 115 The
ICSID Additional Facility was established by the World Bank to
serve as a forum for the resolution of investor-states disputes
where the host State is not a signatory to the ICSID Conven-
tion.116 This Convention came into force in 1966, but it is not a
convention to which either Canada or Mexico have acceded. 117
Review procedures under the Additional Facility differ sub-
stantially from those under the ICSID Convention. Under the
Convention, arbitrations are subject to an internal review
mechanism known as an "ad hoc annulment committee.' ' 18 The
Convention specifically restricts Parties from seeking appeal or
review of arbitral awards except by way of the annulment proc-
ess, thus insulating awards from national law.119 In contrast,
review of an award made under the Additional Facility Rules is
governed by the law of the forum in which the award was made,
including applicable international conventions.1 20
115. Judicial jurisdiction with respect to the review of international arbitral
awards can arise either on application to set aside an award (as in the present case)
or on an application to enforce the award. In the latter case, judicial jurisdiction is
based on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention") of 1958. The New York Conven-
tion allows for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award unless the re-
spondent establishes that the arbitral process suffered from procedural or jurisdic-
tional irregularities, and if the subject matter of the award was not arbitrary or
contrary to the public policy of the enforcing country. All three NAFTA Parties are
signatories to the New York Convention. The grounds upon which a court may re-
fuse to enforce a foreign award are the same as those governing the setting aside of
awards under the UNCITRAL model rules. See Cecil Branson, Court Review of
Awards in Their Country of Origin, in COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN
THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 190-91 (Luis Miguel Diaz & Nancy A. Oretskin eds., 1999).
116. Petitioner's Outline of Argument $ 111 at 30, Metalclad (No. L002904).
117. Id. 110 at 30.
118. Id. 112 at 30-31.
119. See id. 113-114 at 31.
120. Convention on the Settlement of the Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 532, 541 (1965); See
also W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION 46-50 (1992).
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B. ICAA v. CAA
Since the Tribunal determined that the place of the arbitra-
tion was Vancouver, British Columbia, Mexico's petition was
governed by the applicable law of the Province of British Co-
lumbia.121 A key threshold issue for the Court was to determine
under what domestic statute the review should proceed. British
Columbia has enacted a statute to govern the review of interna-
tional commercial arbitrations based on a model law developed
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).12 2 This statute is the International Commercial
Arbitration Act (ICAA).123 As its title suggests, the ICAA ap-
plies to "international commercial" arbitrations. Arbitrations
that do not fit within its terms fall under the jurisdiction of the
Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA) that governs review of most
other arbitrations conducted within the province. 124
Determining which of these two statutes governed review of
the Tribunal's decision was a critical issue because the stan-
dards of review contemplated by ICAA and CAA differ signifi-
cantly. Mexico's position was that the CAA, which allows courts
to set aside awards on broad grounds including errors of law,
should apply. 125 Metalclad submitted that the court's jurisdic-
tion flowed from the ICAA, which authorizes a much more re-
strictive form of review. 126
In support of its position, Mexico contended that while this
was undoubtedly an "international" arbitration, the relationship
between the Parties was not "commercial" as required by the
121. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 118 at 32, Metalclad (No. L002904).
122. See id. 122 at 34-35.
123. R.S.B.C., ch. 233, § 34(2)(a)(iv) [hereinafter ICAA]. The ICAA is based on
the UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration ("Model Law").
Id. The Model Law was adopted by UNCITRAL in 1985. The Model Law sets out a
Code of procedural rules for international commercial arbitration. Since its incep-
tion, many jurisdictions have adopted it, either entirely or with minor changes, into
their own law of international commercial arbitration. All Canadian jurisdictions
have adopted the Model Law, including the Canadian federal government. Com-
mercial Arbitration Act, S.C., ch. 22 (1986) (Can.) [hereinafter CAA]. For a compari-
son of British Columbia's ICAA and the Model Law see Dr. G. Herrmann, The Brit-
ish Columbia Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
MODEL IN CANADA 65 (R. Paterson & B. J. Thompson, eds., 1987); Bonita J. Thomp-
son, The Marriage of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law and the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA 143 (R. Paterson
& B. J. Thompson, eds., 1987).
124. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 120 at 34, Metalclad (No. L002904).
125. See id. 1 127-128 at 36, $ 144 at 42-43.
126. Respondent's Outline of Argument T$ 20-21 at 6, Metalclad (No. L002904).
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ICAA. 127 In its submission:
[Tihe relationship that Metalclad claimed existed between it and Mex-
ico was not commercial, even by the widest definition of that term ...
[the] relationship between Metalclad and Mexico was the relationship
between government and the governed, between legislator and the
subject of legislation .... Likewise, the relationship between Metal-
clad and Mexico arising from the provisions of NAFTA Chapter Eleven
is not a commercial arbitration agreement. The NAFTA is a treaty...
128
Justice Tysoe was not persuaded by these submissions. In
concluding that the ICAA applied, he noted that the definition of
"commercial" contained in the ICAA included a relationship of
"investing."1 9 While acknowledging that the dispute between
Metalclad and the Municipality had arisen "because the Mu-
nicipality was purporting to exercise a regulatory function," in
his view "the primary relationship between Metalclad and Mex-
ico was one of investing." 130
C. APPLICABLE DOMESTIC ARBITRAL REVIEW RULES IN FUTURE
CASES
Despite Justice Tysoe's ruling, there remains considerable
uncertainty as to the applicable rules with respect to setting
aside Chapter Eleven awards in future cases. Arguably the only
Canadian jurisdiction in which the applicable review rules are
clear is at the federal level. This is because the Parliament of
Canada amended the federal statute that is based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law to provide expressly that Chapter
Eleven arbitrations shall be considered "commercial arbitra-
tions" and thus governed by that statute.131 As a result of this
amendment, all Chapter Eleven claims to which Canada is a
Party,132 such as the pending review of tribunal decision in S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada,133 or which arise in re-
127. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 131 at 38, 9$ 134-137 at 39-40,
Metalclad (No. L002904).
128. Id. [ 145-146 at 43.
129. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 91 44 at 372-73.
130. Id. 46 at 373.
131. CAA ch. 17, § 5(4).
132. Respondent's Outline of Argument 83 at 26, Metalclad (No. L002904) (in-
cluding Chapter Eleven claims that fall within federal jurisdiction over admiralty,
maritime, etc.).
133. NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000, at http://www.naftaclaims.com. In February 2001,
the Canadian government filed an application in the Federal Court of Canada to set
aside an award made against it under Chapter Eleven arising out of a federal deci-
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spect of subject matters within federal jurisdiction, are governed
by Canada's version of the Model Law.
Elsewhere in Canada, however, the situation is more uncer-
tain. Like British Columbia, Canada's other nine provinces
have legislatively adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law but, as
yet, have not specified that Chapter Eleven arbitrations are
governed by these statutes that have adopted the Model Law.134
Consequently, for arbitrations that are conducted in these juris-
dictions, it remains open for a party to borrow Mexico's argu-
ment that Chapter Eleven reviews should be governed by do-
mestic arbitral review statutes of general application that offer
more liberal grounds for judicial review. Concern about this
prospect prompted the United States Government to oppose a
proposal to locate the pending Methanex arbitration (a Chapter
Eleven claim commenced by a British Columbia-based company
against United States) in Canada.13 5 The Methanex tribunal ul-
timately designated Washington D.C. as the place of arbitra-
tion.136
Uncertainties also exist with respect to the applicable rules
of review when the arbitral venue is Mexico or the United
States. Similar arguments to those raised in the present case
can be made with respect to Chapter Eleven award review pro-
ceedings conducted in Mexico. Mexico has also adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law but has not taken legislative steps to
clarify whether these provisions apply to Chapter Eleven
claims. 137 With respect to judicial reviews conducted in the
United States, the situation is different. Federally, the United
States has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, instead re-
views conducted within federal jurisdiction are governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).138 The judicial discretion to va-
cate an arbitral award under the FAA, and potentially under re-
sion to ban the export of PCBs generated in Canada. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d TI 61
at 377.
134. For a list of the legislative act in each province, see Thompson, supra note
123, at 165.
135. Methanex Corp. v. United States (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000), at
http://www.naftaclaims.com.
136. Id. at T1 42.
137. 4 C6d.Com, art. 1415-1463 (1996).
138. See Branson, supra note 115, at 208; see also Jessica L. Gelander, Judicial
Review of International Arbitral Awards: Preserving Independence in International
Commercial Arbitrations, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (1997). Although the Model
Law has not been adopted federally, it has been adopted by the states of California,
Connecticut, Oregon, and Texas. PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS, 8-10 (2000).
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lated common law principles, may be considerably broader than
under Model Law-based legislation.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AWARDS UNDER
CHAPTER ELEVEN
A. ICAA GROUNDS FOR SETTING AN AWARD ASIDE
A second threshold matter was the legal standard to be em-
ployed in reviewing the Tribunal's decision. Having decided
that the ICCA governed this review, Justice Tysoe's next task
was to consider the nature and ambit of the review contem-
plated under that statute.
The ICAA offered Mexico three potential grounds for having
the award set aside. In this regard, the applicable provisions of
the ICAA closely track the language of Article 34 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. They allow an award to be set aside on
the grounds that:
1) [T]he award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to ar-
bitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration; 139
2)the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties;140 or
3)the award is in conflict with the public policy in British
Columbia.141
When called upon to apply provisions such as these in juris-
dictions that have implemented the Model Law, courts have ex-
ercised notable restraint, showing considerable deference to le-
gal and factual arbitral findings. The leading British Columbia
decision in the area-Quintette Coal v. Nippon Steel Corp.142-
articulates the standard rationale for this approach:
We are advised that this is the first case under the [ICAA] in which a
party to an international commercial arbitration seeks to set the
award aside. It is important to parties to future such arbitrations and
to the integrity of the process itself that the court express its views on
the degree of deference to be accorded the decision of the arbitrators.
139. ICAA § 34(2)(a)(iv).
140. Id. § 34(2)(a)(v).
141. Id. § 34(2)(b)(ii).
142. Quintette Coal v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1991] 50 B.C.L.R.2d 207 (Can.).
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The reasons ... for restraint in the exercise of judicial review are
highly persuasive. The "concerns of international comity, respect for
the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals' and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes" spoken of by Blackmun J. in Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.143 are as compelling in this
jurisdiction as they are in the United States or elsewhere. It is mete,
therefore, as a matter of policy, to adopt a standard that seeks to pre-
serve the autonomy of the forum selected by the parties and to mini-
mize judicial intervention when reviewing international commercial
arbitral awards in British Columbia. 144
B. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION V. CHAPTER 11
ARBITRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mexico argued forcefully that private commercial arbitra-
tions and arbitrations under Chapter Eleven differ significantly
in a variety of key respects and that therefore it would be a mis-
take to employ the same approach to judicial review in both con-
texts.145 A compelling argument in its favor is that the investor-
state claim procedure is sui generis, possessing many character-
istics that would tend to justify a greater degree of judicial su-
pervision than would otherwise be appropriate in the review of
awards in private commercial arbitrations. 146 Unlike private
commercial arbitrations, a claimant under Chapter Eleven is
not seeking to enforce an agreement to which it is a party. 147 Its
right to seek arbitration is entirely derivative of NAFTA, an in-
ternational treaty. 48 The fact that an investor can seek such re-
lief represents a significant departure from the general interna-
tional law principle that only sovereign States are entitled to
enforce international treaty obligations. 49 It also represents a
departure from the private law principle that strangers to an
agreement cannot invoke its arbitration process because it is
143. 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
144. Quinette Coal, 50 B.C.L.R.2d at 217.
145. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 191 178-185 at 53-56, Metalclad (No.
L002904); see also Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada 9
30 at 12, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.)
(No. L002904).
146. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 179 at 54, 91 184 at 55-56, Metalclad
(No. L002904); see also Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Can-
ada $$ 5 & 7 at 3-4, Metalclad (No. L002904).
147. Petitioner's Outline of Argument $ 8 at 4, Metalclad (No. L002904); see also
Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada 9 8 at 4, Metalclad
(No. L002904).
148. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 91 58 at 15, Metalclad (No. L002904).
149. See id. $1 72 at 19.
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only the parties to the agreement who have consented to resolve
their disputes in this manner.150
Thus, while in private commercial arbitrations, the parties
to the arbitration agreement are the same parties that ulti-
mately appear in court on an application for review, this is not
the case with arbitrations under Chapter Eleven.151 In the lat-
ter circumstance, the need to review the award so as to respect
the autonomy of the "parties" to resolve their dispute in a pre-
ferred arbitral forum is greatly diminished. 152
There are a variety of other factors that tend to support the
position adopted by Mexico that Chapter Eleven awards should
be subjected to an enhanced level of judicial scrutiny. Perhaps
most compelling among these is that while private commercial
arbitrations deal with matters primarily of concern to the im-
mediate private disputants, Chapter Eleven claims have a
strong public character. Frequently, as in the present case and
many other pending and decided Chapter Eleven disputes, the
issues to be decided have broad implications for public policy af-
fecting the ability of governments to promote sustainable devel-
opment and take measures that protect public health and the
environment. 53 The desirability of ensuring that trade and in-
vestment liberalization do not undermine these goals is ex-
pressly recognized throughout NAFTA.154 Indeed, it is in recog-
nition of the need to harmonize trade and environmental
objectives, and to encourage public discussion and debate re-
garding these issues, that the procedural rules and practices
governing Chapter Eleven arbitrations are increasingly depart-
ing from those that have traditionally governed private com-
mercial arbitrations. 5 5 Thus, in recent Chapter Eleven deci-
sions, tribunals have held that the strict principle of
confidentiality that has tended to hold sway in arbitrations be-
150. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d T 57 at 376-77; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
183 (2001) (discussing lack of privity theme in private commercial law).
151. Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada 8-10 at
4-5, Metalclad (No. L002904).
152. See discussion supra Part III.B.
153. See Dhooge, supra note 6, at 273-82 for a discussion of the public policy
implications.
154. In particular, note the reference to sustainable development and environ-
mental protection contained in the NAFTA preamble, art. 1114 and the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation as discussed in Dhooge, supra
note 6, at 274-75.
155. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The
Empire Strikes Back, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 43, 46 (2001)
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tween private parties does not apply with the same force when a
sovereign state is a party to the arbitration.156 For similar rea-
sons, Chapter Eleven tribunals have allowed non-parties to par-
ticipate in arbitral proceedings through the filing of amicus
briefs. 157 Finally, once again unlike private commercial arbitra-
tions, NAFTA specifically allows parties other than the dispu-
tants to take part in Chapter Eleven proceedings. 158
C. A "PRAGMATIC AND FUNDAMENTAL" APPROACH?
Mexico therefore submitted that Justice Tysoe was not con-
strained by the deferential standard of review traditionally em-
ployed in the review of private commercial arbitral awards. 15 9
Rather, it urged him to employ a more flexible test that Cana-
dian courts have employed to determine the appropriate stan-
dard of review when petitioned to review decisions of domestic
tribunals and agencies.160 This so-called "pragmatic and func-
tional" approach calls upon the court to consider a variety of
case-specific factors before determining the appropriate stan-
dard of review. 16 1 According to Mexico, applying this approach
would vest the court with a broader discretionary and more con-
text-specific basis on which to review the Tribunal's decision. 162
Justice Tysoe was not prepared to adopt the pragmatic and
functional test approach. Echoing submissions made by Metal-
clad, 63 he voiced concern about importing into the realm of arbi-
156. The sui generis nature of the Chapter Eleven process is also implicitly rec-
ognized in the recent decision of the Parties to issue an interpretive statement on
this issue. See Interpretive Statement, supra note 24; Sallot & Scoffield, supra note
26, at B1-2; Jan Cienski, NAFTA Chapter 11 Facing Closer Public Scrutiny, NATL
POST, August 1, 2001, at C5.
157. Brower, supra note 155, at 47-48.
158. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1127-1129, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
159. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 202 at 62, Metalclad (No.
L002904).Petitioner's Outline of Argument
160. Id.
161. Relevant factors include: "1) the presence or absence of a privative clause;
2) the relative expertise of the tribunal, as compared to the Court; 3) the nature of
the decision being made (i.e., whether it is a question of law or fact); 4) whether the
decision to be made is 'polycentric' (i.e., necessarily involves a consideration of often-
conflicting and multi-facetted issues); and 5) the purpose of the provision." Id. 203
at 62.
162. See id. 204 at 63.
163. See Respondent's Outline of Argument 169, at 57, Metalclad (No.
L002904):
[tihe question of the appropriate standard of review does not arise under
the International Commercial Arbitration Act. The provisions of that legis-
lation set out a complete code governing the Court's authority to set aside
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
tral review a test "developed as a branch of statutory interpreta-
tion in respect of domestic tribunals created by statute."16 4 In
his view, the standard of review to be employed under the ICAA
was inherent in the language of the Act. It was unnecessary
and unhelpful, he intimated, to bring extraneous legal concepts
or tests to bear on this task.
Other courts will likely be tempted to follow Justice Tysoe's
lead in concluding that applications to set aside Chapter Eleven
awards should be approached solely with reference to the ex-
press statutory language contained in the applicable domestic
review statute. The only source of potential uncertainty is re-
views conducted in the United States where, as has been noted,
Chapter Eleven awards will fall to review under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act. 165 As with laws based on the UNCITRAL model,
the FAA expressly provides that an award may be vacated on
the basis that the tribunal exceeded its authority. 16 6 However,
American courts have interpreted the FAA as leaving open an
additional common law ground for setting aside an award
known as the "manifest disregard" standard. 67  This non-
statutory standard emerges from dicta in the 1953 U.S. Su-
preme Court case of Wilko v. Swan.168 Many courts have since
relied on the comments in Wilko as an additional ground for ar-
bitral review, although this manifest disregard standard has
also been the subject of judicial criticism. 169 The standard has
been characterized as "something beyond and different from a
mere error of law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to un-
derstand or apply the law,"1 70 that arises where the arbitrator
"understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore
it." 171 Of late, the vitality of this standard has been cast into se-
an arbitral award including the bases for review, and implicitly, the stan-
dard of review to be applied. There is no need to look beyond the language
of the statute to determine the appropriate standard of review.
Id.
164. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 54 at 375.
165. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
166. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
167. 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
168. Id.
169. This is especially true in Eleventh and Seventh Circuit decisions. See, e.g.,
Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (11th Cir. 1990); Bavarati v. Joseph-
thal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Gelander, supra
note 138, at 636-37.
170. Siegal v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cir. 1985), quoted in Ge-
lander, supra note 137, at 636).
171. Id.
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rious doubt 172 but the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet pro-
nounced its fate.
IV. INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD OF
TREATMENT: ARTICLE 1105
A. THE AWARD
The primary basis upon which the Tribunal held Mexico li-
able for damages was its violation of Article 1105. As discussed,
in making this finding, it concluded that Article 1105 imposed a
broad obligation on Mexico to create and maintain a domestic
legal and regulatory environment that offers a high level of pre-
dictability and certainty for investors. 17 3 Moreover, the Tribunal
held that where a central government was aware that subordi-
nate governments had interfered with or undermined investor
certainty, or acted in ways that were inconsistent with applica-
ble domestic law, the central government is duty-bound to in-
tervene to protect the investor's interest or face liability under
Article 1105.174
According to the Tribunal, these transparency-related obli-
gations were a component of a host State's duty under Article
1105(1) to ensure that NAFTA investors receive "treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security."175 In support of this
conclusion, the Tribunal relied on Chapter One of NAFTA,
which it characterized as making "prominent" reference to the
concept of "transparency. '176 It cited NAFTA Article 102(1) to
the effect that "an underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote
and increase cross-border investment opportunities and ensure
the successful implementation of investment initiatives. '17 7 Ul-
timately, the Tribunal concluded that Mexico had violated Arti-
cle 1105 due to the legally "improper" actions of state and local
172. Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.
1999).
173. Award, supra note 3, 76 at 26-27.
174. See id. 74-76 at 26-27.
175. See id. 74 at 26, (quoting NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at
639) (emphasis added).
176. Award, supra note 3, 76 at 26-27 (citing NAFTA, supra note 65, art.
102(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297).
177. Award, supra note 3, 91 75 at 26-27 (citing NAFTA, supra note 65, art.
102(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297).
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governments in relation to Metalclad, and the failure of the fed-
eral government, knowing of the difficulties Metalclad was en-
countering, to intervene on investor's behalf.
B. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
The investor protections under Article 1105 complement
those that investors receive under two companion provisions;
Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1103 (most favored na-
tion treatment). Article 1102 requires that a Party must treat
the investors and investments of another Party no less favorably
than it treats its own investors and their investments.178 Article
1103 requires that a Party must treat the investors and invest-
ments of another Party no worse than it treats the investors or
investments of any other party.179 The national treatment and
most favored treatment principles (or "disciplines") are relative
concepts: a Party's compliance with these disciplines is defined
in relation to how that Party treats other investors.
In contrast, Article 1105 imposes an absolute duty that ren-
ders irrelevant how the Party treats other investors or invest-
ments. 80 In other words, it is designed to ensure that investors
or investments of another Party can legally expect to receive
treatment that is in accordance with an absolute minimum
standard. As expressed in a recent decision, Article 1105 "[is a
floor below which treatment of foreign investors must not fall,
even if a government is not acting in a discriminatory man-
ner."'81
What legal foundation supports this conceptual floor was,
and remains, a matter of considerable dispute and uncertainty.
The Tribunal's decision brings into focus three key issues: (1)
whether Article 1105 is based exclusively on the customary in-
ternational law notion of "minimum treatment" or on broader
notions of procedural fairness; (2) what sources of law may be
relied upon to define the scope of the Article; and finally (3) to
what extent may a tribunal consider and make determinations
on questions of domestic law when deciding whether a Party is
in breach of its obligations under the Article.
178. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1102, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
179. Id. art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
180. Id. art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40.
181. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 61-63 at 377-78.
[Vo1.11:183
20021 METALCLAD REVISITED: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 209
1. Article 1105 and International Law
Mexico contended that, with respect to all of these issues,
the Tribunal committed errors that justified setting aside its
award. With respect to the first issue, it is clear that the Tribu-
nal proceeded on the basis that the scope of Article 1105 ex-
tended beyond norms that have become an accepted part of cus-
tomary international law. This is evident insofar as its decision
does not invoke customary international law as the basis for im-
posing transparency requirements on Mexico; rather, in its
view, these requirements flowed from conventional interna-
tional law, namely the NAFTA. The two Chapter Eleven tribu-
nals that have directly considered this key question have ar-
rived at divergent conclusions.
The tribunal in S.D. Myers held that the terms "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" modify
and illustrate the concept of international minimum standard.18 2
As such, it concluded that the Article would only be violated
"when it is shown that an investor has been treated in such an
unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level
that is unacceptable from the international perspective."18 3 In
making this determination, it emphasized that a tribunal must
pay deference to the right of domestic authorities to regulate
matters within their borders, and to applicable international
law.18 4 The tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada8 5 inter-
182. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 62 at 378.
183. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 63 at 378. See also Petitioner's Reply 123 at
32, Metalclad (No. L002904) (noting that "Official acts in relation to murder, armed
robbery, arbitrary and unlawful detentions, kidnappings and hostage-takings have
been found to violate the international minimum standard. The conduct attributed
to Mexico, even on Metalclad's interpretation of the facts, is not remotely like that
found in the existing cases."); Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60
(Mexico-U.S. General Claims Comm'n) (1926) [murder]; United States (Faulkner) v.
United Mexican States 21 A.J.I.L. 349 (Mexico-U.S. General Claims Comm'n) (1927)
[imprisoned without charge]; United States (Chattin) v. United Mexican States, 22
A.J.I.L. 667 (Mexico-U.S. General Claims Comm'n) (1928) [grave judicial irregulari-
ties]; United States (Roberts) v. United Mexican States, Op. of Com. 77 (Mexico-U.S.
General Claims Comm'n) (1926) [arbitrary detention in intolerable conditions];
United States (Way) v. United Mexican States, 23 A.J.I.L. 466 (1929) (Mexico-U.S.
General Claims Comm'n) [arbitrary arrest and detention]; Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1979 I.C.J. 3 [hostage-taking];
Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Rep. Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 577 (ICSID Tribunal) (1991)
[BIT case-destruction of property during battle between government troops and
armed guerillas]; Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1531 (ICSID Tribunal)
(1997) [BIT case-looting by government forces].
184. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 63 at 378.
185. NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2001, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
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preted the Article much more broadly. In its view, Chapter
Eleven investors enjoy not only the benefit of such protections
as exist under international law but also added "fairness ele-
ments."18 6 It supported this conclusion by relying on language
found in the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 1987.187 In so
doing, the Tribunal rejected the submission of the United States
as intervenor that the NAFTA Parties did not intend to diverge
from the customary international law concept of fair and equi-
table treatment. 88
2. Article 1105 and the NAFTA Architecture
Mexico's second argument was that the Tribunal exceeded
its jurisdiction by importing into Chapter Eleven transparency
obligations articulated elsewhere in the NAFTA. In this regard,
Mexico noted that transparency is nowhere mentioned in Chap-
ter Eleven.'8 9 And while the concept is addressed in Chapter
Eighteen, Mexico emphasized that party obligations set forth
outside Chapter Eleven are not enforceable by private parties
under Chapter Eleven. 90 In Mexico's submission, the governing
law with respect to the rights of investors that the Tribunal was
bound to apply was exclusively set out in Chapter Eleven as de-
fined in the context of customary international law.191
Mexico also submitted that, in any event, the Tribunal mis-
construed the nature of the transparency obligations imposed
under Chapter Eighteen. In this regard, it noted that the Tri-
bunal misstated the language of Article 102(1), which, contrary
to what the Tribunal suggested, did not require the Parties to
"ensure" the successful implementation of investment initiatives
but rather exhorts them to take steps to "increase substantially
investment opportunities" within the NAFTA region.' 92 More-
over, it noted that the Tribunal erroneously characterized
"transparency" as an "objective" of NAFTA whereas the Agree-
AwardMerits-e.pdf, quoted in Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 64 at 378).
186. Pope & Talbot, 1 109-113 at 47-52.
187. The provision states that investment shall be accorded fair and equitable
treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded
treatment less than that required by international law. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d
64 at 378.
188. Id.
189. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument T[ 248 at 78, Metalclad (No. L002904).
190. See id. 250 at 77.
191. See id. 9T 244 at 76.
192. See id. $ 263-265 at 81-82.
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ment clearly stipulates that it is one of a number of principles
and rules through which NAFTA's various objectives are to be
accomplished. 193
3. Article 1105 and Domestic Law
The third ground relied on by Mexico to set aside the award
was that the Tribunal "substituted itself for a Mexican court,
disagreeing with the decisions of the Municipality and finding
that in its view of Mexican law, the permit denial was im-
proper. ' 194 To this end, Mexico asserted that the Tribunal ig-
nored the fact that a Mexican court had rejected, on jurisdic-
tional grounds, a challenge brought by Metalclad with respect to
the permit denial, a rejection Metalclad later appealed but ulti-
mately abandoned. According to Mexico, by ignoring these facts,
and constituting itself as a "Mexican court of appeal" empow-
ered it to decide questions of domestic law, the Tribunal as-
sumed a jurisdiction it did not possess.1 95 Moreover, it argued
that the State of Mexico should only be held liable, in such cir-
cumstances, if there was no domestic mechanism available to
the investor capable of resolving alleged domestic impropriety,
in which case the absence or inadequacy of such an mechanism
might then give rise to a breach of international law actionable
under Chapter Eleven. 196
C. THE DECISION ON REVIEW
The issue for Justice Tysoe on review was whether the three
errors alleged by Mexico constituted a legal basis for setting
aside the award under the ICAA. Ultimately he decided that
Mexico should succeed with respect to the first two grounds for
review it had advanced on the basis that the Tribunal exceeded
the scope of the submission to arbitration. 197 As a result, he did
not find it necessary to consider Mexico's arguments with re-
spect to the third ground: namely that the Tribunal lacked ju-
risdiction to decide issues of domestic law.198
Justice Tysoe had little difficulty in concluding that Article
193. Id. 1 266-269 at 82-83.
194. Id. 1 280 at 85.
195. See Petitioner's Reply § I at 30-31, Metalclad (No. L002904); Petitioner's
Outline of Argument 1 46 at 10-11, 1 280-283 at 85-86, Metalclad (No. L002904).
196. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument § C at 84-88, Metalclad (No. L002904).
197. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 137 at 396.
198. See supra Part VI.D.3.
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1105 only protected investors against state action that offended
the minimum standard of treatment recognized in customary in-
ternational law.199 In his view, there was no evidence that
transparency had become part of customary international
law.20 0 Nor was he persuaded that the NAFTA Parties intended
to depart from prevailing customary law in this regard.20 1 Had
they wished to depart from customary law and adopt the
broader protections available under the Model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty, he reasoned, they would have employed explicit
language to this end.20 2 In this regard, he expressly disagreed
with the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, preferring the analysis of
the tribunal in SD Myers.20
3
A more difficult question was whether it could be said that
the Tribunal had exceeded the scope of the submission to arbi-
tration. Was this an instance of the Tribunal "simply inter-
pret[ing] the wording of Article 1105?"204 If this were the case,
he doubted whether he possessed jurisdiction to set aside the
award.20 5 In his view, however, the error committed by the Tri-
bunal was more profound; in his words, the Tribunal had "mis-
stated the applicable law to include transparency obligations
and it then made its decision on the basis of the concept of
transparency."20 6
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Tysoe relied heavily on
Mexico's arguments that the Tribunal had incorrectly identified
transparency as an objective of NAFTA, and that it erroneously
imported the transparency provisions of Chapter Eighteen into
its analysis of state obligations under Chapter Eleven. 20 7 In his
opinion, it was clear that the Tribunal had held Mexico liable on
the basis of transparency and, in so doing, went beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration "because there are no
transparency obligations contained in Chapter Eleven."208  In
this regard, he was careful to note that even had he agreed with
the analysis of the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, he would have
199. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 60 at 577, 62 at 378.
200. Id. 168 at 379.
201. Id. 65 at 379.
202. Id.
203. See id. $ 64-65 at 378-79.
204. See id. $ 70 at 380.
205. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 1 69 at 380.
206. Id. 70 at 380.
207. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 71-72 at 380.
208. Id. 72 at 381.
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still arrived at the same conclusion.209 This was because regard-
less of whether Article 1105 imposed obligations broader than
those prevailing under customary international law, the NAFTA
Parties could not be taken to have agreed to transparency re-
quirements found elsewhere in NAFTA.21° By purporting to im-
pose such requirements, the Tribunal exceeded the scope of the
Parties submission to arbitrate. 211
As noted in the introduction, three months after Justice Ty-
soe's decision was rendered, the NAFTA Free Trade Commis-
sion issued an interpretive statement on the ambit of Article
1105 that lends strong support to the conclusions he reached in
this part of his judgment. The statement unequivocally restricts
the obligations of the Parties under the Article to providing
treatment in accordance with international minimum standards
as prescribed in international customary law.2 1 2 In so doing, the
statement represents a clear rejection of the conclusion of the
Tribunal in Pope and Talbot that the Article imposed additional
"fairness elements" akin to those found in the Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty. The interpretive statement also addresses
the question of whether a breach of provisions contained else-
where in the NAFTA or other international agreements can
provide the foundation for concluding that there has been a
breach of Article 1105. In this regard, the statement does not go
so far as to suggest, as Justice Tysoe has done, that it is imper-
missible for a tribunal to consider such breaches when deciding
whether a Party has violated the Article. It does, however, un-
derscore that breaches of international obligations other than
those set out in Chapter Eleven are not sufficient on their own
to establish a breach of Article 1105. 213
V. EXPROPRIATION: ARTICLE 1110
A. THE AWARD
Most of the public attention garnered by Chapter Eleven to
date is due to the uncertainty surrounding the scope and nature
of its provisions dealing with expropriation as set out in Article
209. Id. 74 at 381.
210. Id. 75 at 381.
211. See id. 74 at 381.
212. See Interpretive Statement, supra note 24, § B.
213. See id.
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1110(1). Critics have argued that the breadth of the language in
this Article leaves open the possibility that investors will be able
to secure damage awards for adverse affect to investments
where governments have implemented bona fide measures to
protect public health or the environment. 214
In holding Mexico liable for damages under Chapter Eleven,
the Tribunal held that Mexico had violated Article 1110 in two
ways. First, it concluded that the facts that gave rise to the con-
clusion that Mexico failed to meet its "transparency" obligations
under Article 1105 also constituted a violation of Article 1110.215
In the alternative, it held that the actions of the state govern-
ment in passing and implementing the Ecological Decree also
constituted a violation of the Article. 216
Despite the fact that Article 1110 formed the basis for two
of the three grounds upon which it concluded Mexico was liable
under Chapter Eleven, the Tribunal's discussion of its jurisdic-
tion over expropriation under the Article is remarkably
sparse.217 After setting out the text of Article 1110(1), the Tri-
bunal stated:
Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or for-
mal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use
or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.
218
The Tribunal did not elaborate or provide authority in sup-
port of the conclusions contained in this paragraph; indeed, its
use of the term "thus" suggests that it considered that this con-
clusion followed "inexorably from the language of Article
1110."219
According to the Tribunal, the Article protects investors not
only against measures in the nature of expropriation, but also
214. See generally Dhooge, supra note 6; David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environ-
mental Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. R.
10646 (2001); MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 10; J. Martin Wagner, International
Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 465 (1999); Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and
Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming
Winter 2002).
215. Award, supra note 3, 104 at 195.
216. Id. T 109 at 196.
217. Award, supra note 3, T 103 at 195.
218. Id.
219. Petitioner's Outline of Argument T 309 at 96, Metalclad (No. L002904).
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from measures that interfere with property rights. This conclu-
sion is highly controversial both in terms of legal soundness and
its ramifications for the fiscal capacity, political appetite and le-
gal ability of governments to regulate in the public interest.
Imposing on a Party the obligation to pay compensation
whenever it enacts a measure that incidentally interferes with
an investor's exercise of its property rights-or reasonably an-
ticipated economic benefits that might flow the exercise of such
rights-has far-reaching budgetary and sovereignty implica-
tions for domestic governments. This is particularly, but not ex-
clusively, the case with respect to regulatory policy designed to
promote environmental and public health objectives. Moreover,
it is an interpretation that imposes obligations that extend far
beyond those that states owe to investors under domestic Ameri-
can, Canadian and Mexican law.2
20
B. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
More germane to the judicial review was the question of
whether the Tribunal's decision was vulnerable to be set aside.
In this regard, both Mexico and Metalclad agreed that the Tri-
bunal was obliged to apply Article 1110 in a manner that was
consistent with the prevailing customary international law defi-
nition of "expropriation."221 Under the UNCITRAL Model law,
in order for the Tribunal's decision to be set aside, Mexico was
required to establish that the Tribunal did not simply commit
an error of law in interpreting and applying Article 1110, but
rather that it acted in a manner that could justify the conclusion
that it exceeded its jurisdiction. 222 This was a tall order given
the fluid and uncertain nature of the applicable customary in-
ternational law.
1. Customary International Law
Classical customary international law has traditionally rec-
ognized the existence of two distinct varieties of compensable
expropriation. The first, direct expropriation, occurs where a
State undertakes a measure that directly deprives a former
220. For a useful summary of current U.S. takings law see Palazzolo v. State ex
rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
221. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 546 at 163, Metalclad (No.
L002904); see also Respondent's Outline of Argument 531 at 153, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
222. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d % 50 at 374.
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owner of their property rights by way of seizure, legislation or
nationalization. 223 Customary international law also recognizes,
however, that a State is liable to pay compensation in situations
where the impugned measure has affected property rights in a
more indirect fashion. 224 The ambit of what is usually termed
indirect expropriation (or "creeping expropriation") has eluded
precise definition. Unlike direct expropriation, indirect expro-
priation is said to arise where the owner formally retains legal
title to the property in question but suffers serious interference
with his or her property rights that are attributable to state ac-
tion.225 The open-ended nature of this definition leaves key
questions unresolved on which Justice Tysoe received lengthy
submissions.
One area of dispute concerned how serious and permanent
an interference must be before it qualifies as indirect expropria-
tion under customary international law. 2 6 The position taken
by Mexico was that the interference must be so serious as "to af-
fect title" of the property and that it must be permanent and ir-
reversible. 227  For its part, Metalclad emphasized the fact-
dependent nature of the inquiry, asserting that indirect expro-
priations frequently arise through the "cumulative effects" of
government action. Under this approach, it was unnecessary
that the State actions adversely impact title before compensa-
tion was owed; moreover, the deprivation of property rights need
only be "significant" and not merely "ephemeral."228
A second area of definitional dispute concerned the rele-
vance of the policy rationale underlying the impugned measure.
On this point, Metalclad's position was categorical: a duty to
compensate under international customary law for interference
with property can arise "whether or not it is the by-product of
223. See Respondent's Outline of Argument 53 at 153, Metalclad (No.
L002904) (citing Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elenda, S.A., Rep. of Costa Rica
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 76-77, ICSID Rev., at 193-94).
224. See id.
225. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 1 554 at 166, Metalclad (No. L002904)
(citing Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing In-
ternational Inc. v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Omran,
Bank Mellat, and Bank Marzaki (Iran-US Claims Tribunal 1983) 85 I.L.R. 349 at
390).
226. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d % 78 at 381-82.
227. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 91 555 at 166, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
228. Respondent's Outline of Argument 91 527-528 at 151-52, Metalclad (No.
L002904) (citing Compania del Desarrallo, ICSID Rev. 1 77 at 194 with respect to
"ephemeral").
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otherwise legitimate regulation and even though substantial in-
terference with property interests was not the government's os-
tensible intention."229  Mexico argued that this position
amounted to a "radical departure from classical international
law."230
2. Customary International Law in Article 1110
Learned commentaries on customary international law
seem to support the approach advocated by Mexico. According
to such commentaries, customary international law has resisted
pressures to expand the obligations of States to compensate for
other deprivations of property rights for two reasons: (1) to do
otherwise would make it impossible for governments to carry
out their legitimate functions; and (2) the right of States to take
regulatory action for the common good of society is a core fea-
ture of state sovereignty. 231 On this point, as intervenor, Can-
ada urged the Court to be mindful of the decision in SD Myers,
where that tribunal quite clearly expressed the view that non-
discriminatory regulatory measures taken to protect the public
interest, particularly in relation to public health and the envi-
ronment, did not constitute expropriation contrary to Chapter
Eleven. 232
Metalclad contended that when the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the relationship between the investor and
Mexican regulatory authorities was considered, the inexorable
conclusion was that its investment had been expropriated as
was properly found by the Tribunal.233 Mexico's position, in con-
trast, was that the Tribunal adopted an entirely novel and over-
broad definition of expropriation under Article 1110 unknown to
customary international law.234 Secondly, it asserted that, even
applying the test it had itself enunciated, the Tribunal had
erred in finding a violation of Article 1110 because at no time
229. See Respondent's Outline of Argument T 526 at 151, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
230. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 561 at 168, Metalclad (No. L002904).
231. See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 298-300
(1994).
232. See Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada 9 67 at
21, Metalclad (No. L002904).
233. Respondent's Outline of Argument 1 522-523 at 153, 1 529-530, at 155-
56, Metalclad (No. L002904).
234. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 1 547 at 163, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
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did Metalclad possess a property right to operate a hazardous
waste facility.235 In particular, Mexico contended that the pre-
sent facts were readily distinguishable from instances in which
a State had shut down or curtailed a licensed or permitted activ-
ity.236 Mexico also claimed that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to consider Metalclad's claim arising from the Ecological Decree
that was issued nine months after the company had abandoned
its plan to proceed with the Landfill and commenced arbitration
proceedings, asserting that this constituted an "additional
claim" that was only arbitrable with its consent.237 Finally, it
contended that the Ecological Decree was a lawful and valid ex-
ercise of governmental police powers that could be justified un-
der Article 1114 of NAFTA that protects the rights of Parties to
adopt bona fide environmental measures. 238
C. THE DECISION ON REVIEW
Justice Tysoe dealt with the issue of expropriation in two
stages: pre- and post-Ecological Decree. As noted earlier, the
facts invoked by the Tribunal to conclude that Mexico was in
breach of its transparency obligations under Article 1105 were
virtually identical to those it relied on to conclude that Mexico
was in breach of Article 1110.239
Justice Tysoe found this troubling, observing that the Tri-
bunal's analysis of Article 1105 had "infected its analysis of Ar-
ticle 1110" as it applied to Mexico's actions pre-Ecological De-
cree.240 In his view, the Tribunal's reliance on a concept that
was beyond the scope of the submission to arbitrate-
transparency-to ground a conclusion that there had been an
"expropriation" contrary to Article 1110 meant that this latter
finding must also be set aside on the ground that it was beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitrate. 241
His reasons with respect to the status and implications of
the Ecological Decree are somewhat more complex. In his view,
the Tribunal's finding with respect to the Ecological Decree was
235. See id. 339-341 at 105-06.
236. See id. 47 at 11, 563-566 at 169-70.
237. See Article 48 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 102; see
also discussion in Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 77-95 at 381-85.
238. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument J 435 at 132-33, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
239. See Award, supra note 3, 104 at 195.
240. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 1 78 at 381-82.
241. See id. 91 79 at 382, 133 at 395.
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not connected to its earlier analysis on the "transparency" is-
sue. 242 As such, it was necessary for him to consider whether to
set aside the Tribunal's finding that the Ecological Decree,
standing alone, violated Article 1110.243
He rejected, in summary fashion, Mexico's argument that
the Tribunal should not have considered the Ecological Decree
as a separate ground, holding that Mexico had ample opportu-
nity to respond to the argument as it was clearly advanced in
Metalclad's initial memorial in the case. 244 Mexico also argued,
however, that the definition of "expropriation" adopted by the
Tribunal was a "patently unreasonable" error of law, an error
that was so clearly wrong that it constituted a basis for setting
aside the Tribunal's decision under the ICAA.245 It therefore
contended that an error of this seriousness should be considered
as a "variety of excess of jurisdiction" or, alternatively, as an
independent ground for setting aside the award on the basis
that it conflicted with public policy.2 46
The concept of "patently unreasonable" originates in Cana-
dian administrative law;247 it is not a term that appears in, or
has been relied on previously, by courts when interpreting the
ICAA or the Model Law.248 Its function in Canadian adminis-
trative law is to balance the value of recognizing tribunal auton-
omy and expertise with the value of judicial accountability. 249
As such, it is a test that insulates a tribunal from judicial inter-
vention with respect to simple errors of law and fact while em-
powering a reviewing court to overturn a decision that it deems
patently unreasonable. 250
In the result, it was unnecessary for Justice Tysoe to decide
whether "patent unreasonableness" should be recognized as a
basis for setting aside an award under the ICAA.251  This was
242. Id. 94 at 385.
243. Id.
244. Id. 88-90 at 384.
245. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 46 at 10-11, 221 at 70-71, 374-
375 at 116-17, Metalclad (No. L002904).
246. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d T 96 at 385. The public policy ground is set
out in § 34(2)(b)(ii) of the ICAA, supra note 123.
247. See, e.g., Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2
S.C.R. 557 (Can.); Canada (Director of Investigations and Research) v. Southam Inc.,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
248. Id.
249. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 172 at 52, Metalclad (No. L002904).
250. Id.
251. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 97 at 386.
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because, in his view, the Tribunal did not commit a "patently
unreasonable" error in its analysis of the Ecological Decree. 252
Dealing first with the Tribunal's definition of "expropria-
tion", Justice Tysoe acknowledged that it was "extremely broad"
and, in his opinion, could be violated by a "legitimate rezoning of
property by a municipality or other zoning authority."253 How-
ever, in his view, the definition of expropriation was a question
of law with which he was not entitled to interfere under
ICAA. 254 Moreover, the manner in which the Tribunal applied
this definition to the facts surrounding the issuance of the Eco-
logical Decree could not, in his view, be said to be "patently un-
reasonable".255 In particular, he noted Mexico's argument that
the Tribunal had failed to address whether the Ecological De-
cree might be justified under Article 1114(1) of NAFTA as a
measure taken to "ensure that investment activity... [was] un-
dertaken in manner sensitive to environmental concerns."256
However, in Justice Tysoe's view, it could not be said that the
Tribunal's failure in this regard was "patently unreasonable."257
As such, Justice Tysoe concluded that he had no jurisdiction
under the ICAA to set aside the Tribunal's decision that the
Ecological Decree amounted to an expropriation without com-
pensation, contrary to Article 1110.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FUTURE
CHAPTER 11 AWARDS
Mexico won, in that Chapter Eleven can't hurt them as much anymore
.... Our case has shown it is almost frivolous to pursue your rights.
Anthony Dabbene, (CFO, Metalclad) on Justice Tysoe's decision258
The Tribunal took a treaty obligation in Chapter Eighteen and read it
into Article 1105. The implications of this, if it were allowed to stand,
would be horrendous.. .it [Justice Tysoe's decision] was a great result
in terms of getting rid of some terrible law.
252. Id.
253. Id. 99 at 386.
254. Id.
255. Id. 1 100 at 386.
256. Id. 104 at 386.
257. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 104 at 386.
258. US Firm Sees NAFTA Case Win as Hollow Victory, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
May 5, 2001, Canadian Business, at B3.
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Anonymous source quoted in International Trade Reporter
25 9
Although Justice Tysoe's judgment may not have been
warmly received at Metalclad headquarters, it is unlikely that
other NAFTA investors will share this gloomy assessment. For
the most part, the decision is a highly cautious one that ap-
proaches the task of reviewing the award deferentially. This in-
terpretation keeps with the posture courts have traditionally
adopted when reviewing awards made in the private interna-
tional commercial law context. It carefully refrains from em-
barking on a trial de novo style reconsideration of the legal is-
sues decided during the course of the Tribunal's work.260 It also
leaves unanswered a variety of intriguing and important inter-
pretive and procedural questions relating to the future opera-
tion of Chapter Eleven. 26'
A. NATURE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
One of the hardest-fought battles before Justice Tysoe, and
one in which Metalclad can claim an unequivocal victory, con-
cerns the threshold issue of characterizing the nature of the re-
view process. Mexico forcefully contended that the deferential
approach to review that courts have traditionally used in the re-
view of private commercial arbitral awards is inappropriate, and
that a more interventionist supervisory jurisdiction should be
employed.262 As discussed earlier, there are compelling concep-
tual and contextual reasons that support Mexico's position.
A key reason why courts defer to arbitral awards in the pri-
vate commercial context is their concern for respecting the
autonomy of the arbitrating parties to decide the scope of the
submission to arbitrate. 263 In the context of Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA, however, the investor is not a party to the submission
to arbitrate.264 Moreover, Mexico argued with some force that
the context within which Chapter Eleven arbitrations arise
259. Peter Menyasz , Mexico challenges NAFTA ruling in favour of U.S. Waste
Management Firm, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER CURRENT REPORTS (May 8,
2001) 296 available at http://www.bna.com/current/itr/maintop.htm.
260. See generally Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d at 359-96.
261. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 1$ 119-132 at 390-95.
262. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 179-186 at 54-56, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
263. See generally ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3-8 (3d ed. 1999).
264. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 90-93 at 24-25, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
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dramatically differs from that which ordinarily gives rise to dis-
putes dealt with in the three arbitral facilities designated under
NAFTA.265 While these facilities are accustomed to dealing with
private disputes of limited concern to non-parties, Mexico ar-
gued that Chapter Eleven disputes involved quintessentially
public issues.266
On the basis of these submissions, Mexico asked Justice Ty-
soe to proceed into uncharted waters. Its goal was to persuade
him to depart from the prevailing jurisprudence with respect to
the review of arbitral awards under the B.C. version of the
UNCITRAL model law and adopt a more rigorous approach to
reviewing awards made under Chapter Eleven 267 Mexico pro-
posed that such an approach could be developed by invoking,
through analogy, jurisprudential concepts-the so-called "prag-
matic and functional" approach and the "patently unreasonable"
test-that have evolved in the context of domestic Canadian
administrative law. 268
Justice Tysoe's reasons do not disclose whether he was
sympathetic to Mexico's arguments concerning the conceptual
and contextual reasons that might justify a different approach
to judicial review under Chapter Eleven than ordinarily prevails
in private commercial arbitrations. 69 It is clear, however, that
he was uncomfortable with Mexico's submission to the extent
that it suggested he depart from the literal language of the
ICAA. Undoubtedly, judges in other jurisdictions will be called
upon to consider this same argument before long. Whether they
will share Justice Tysoe's diffidence on this issue remains to be
seen.
B. ARTICLE 1110: EXPROPRIATION
Having concluded that his jurisdiction to review the Tribu-
nal's award was limited to the grounds specified under the
ICAA, it is not surprising that Justice Tysoe declined to grapple
with the question of whether the Tribunal erred in defining "ex-
265. Id. IT 96-104 at 26-29, 1 110 at 29; see Respondent's Outline of Argument 1I
44 at 14, Metalclad (No. L002904).
266. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 163-164 at 48, 184-185 at 55-56,
Metalclad (No. L002904).
267. See id. 193 at 58.
268. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 198 at 59-60, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
269. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 9191 53-54 at 375-76; see also Petitioner's Out-
line of Argument IT 163-164 at 48, 991 184-185 at 55-56, Metalclad (No. L002904).
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propriation" for the purposes of Article 1110. While clearly
aware that the Tribunal's definition is "extremely broad," Jus-
tice Tysoe did not see his function as assessing whether the Tri-
bunal has arrived at a definition that was legally correct, or for
that matter even close to being legally correct. 270 Even if the
waters of customary international law on this topic were not so
murky, it would seem that he was unprepared to dive in.
Justice Tysoe's decision to review the award of the Tribunal
on a deferential private international law standard and his re-
lated decision to eschew entirely review of its controversial defi-
nition of "expropriation" will disappoint critics of Chapter
Eleven.27 1 It will also undoubtedly be cited by some as further
evidence that the Chapter gives precedence to trade law over
domestic regulation, to corporate power over community control,
and to investor rights over state sovereignty. 272 More to the
point, Justice Tysoe's decision underscores the limits of judicial
review as a meaningful vehicle for exercising supervisory con-
trol over the interpretive discretion vested in Chapter Eleven
tribunals.
Consequently, Justice Tysoe's decision is likely to add fod-
der to the argument that the NAFTA Parties should issue an in-
terpretive statement with respect to the nature and scope of Ar-
ticle 1110. Until very recently, Mexico has strongly resisted the
suggestion that interpretive statements be used to clarify the
meaning of Chapter Eleven provisions, despite Canadian - and,
of late, American - support for such an approach. 273 Since the
election of President Fox, Mexico has adopted a more concilia-
tory posture on this question, a direct result of which is the Par-
ties' interpretive statement on confidentiality issues and Article
1105 announced in July 2001.274
What is perhaps most striking about this interpretive
statement is that is does not address the vexed issue of expro-
priation under Article 1110, a provision that is in far greater
need of clarification than any other in Chapter Eleven. Now
that the Parties have shown a willingness to employ interpre-
tive statements, and Justice Tysoe's decision has illustrated the
270. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 99 at 386.
271. Id. at 1 39-49 at 371-73, 77-80 at 381-82.
272. See Dhooge, supra note 6, at 273-74.
273. See id. at 286 (citing then-Canadian Minister of International Trade Sergio
Marchi, Address to the NAFTA Fifth Anniversary Luncheon, MANN AND VON
MOLTKE, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing Mexico's reluctance)).
274. Interpretive Statement, supra note 24.
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limited role of judicial review in constraining the interpretive
discretion of Chapter Eleven tribunals, the Parties will likely
face increasing pressure to develop an interpretive statement
that specifically addresses Article 1110.
In this regard, critics have urged the formulation of an in-
terpretive statement that specifically excludes from challenge
under Chapter Eleven non-discriminatory measures based on a
public purpose consistent with a legitimate objective as defined
in Article 915(1).275 For environmental measures that are al-
leged to be discriminatory, the interpretive statement would di-
rect the tribunal to consider a variety of factors before reaching
a conclusion that Chapter Eleven has been violated including:
(1) the investment's location and likely environmental impacts;
(2) the local environment's carrying capacity; (3) the current
state of relevant scientific knowledge; and (4) the need for gov-
ernments to employ a precautionary approach to develop-
ment.276 An interpretive statement of this kind would thus al-
low governments to legally defend measures taken on the basis
of legitimate environmental, scientific and public policy con-
cerns that would "otherwise appear to be a discriminatory con-
fiscation of a foreign investment."277
C. ARTICLE 1105: TRANSPARENCY AND INTERNATIONAL
MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT
For Mexico, the most welcome aspect of Justice Tysoe's
judgment was his decision to set aside what one of Metalclad's
co-counsel characterized as the most groundbreaking element of
the award: the Tribunal's finding that Mexico had breached its
obligations to ensure a transparent regulatory environment for
NAFTA investors. 278 This is a conclusion that critics of Chapter
Eleven should applaud. The sweeping nature of the Tribunal
275. Chapter 9 of NAFTA sets standards with respect to the creation, mainte-
nance and operation of technical regulations and sanitary measures by the Parties.
Article 915(1) prescribes the legitimate objectives that such regulations and meas-
ures may validly serve. These "legitimate objectives" include: (a) safety; (b) protec-
tion of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers ... ; and
(c) sustainable development, considering, among other things, where appropriate,
fundamental climatic, or other geographical factors, technological or infrastructural
factors, or scientific justification but does not include the protection of domestic pro-
duction. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 915(1), 32 I.L.M. at 391-92.
276. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 10, at 72-73; Dhooge, supra note 6, at
288.
277. See Dhooge, supra note 6, at 288.
278. Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d T 57-76 at 376-81.
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decision in this respect was nothing short of revolutionary; im-
posing on host States an affirmative obligation to relieve inves-
tors of all risks, legal, political and otherwise, inherent in the
regulatory process.27 9 If the existence of such an obligation un-
der Chapter Eleven were to be generally recognized it would
amount to an unprecedented constraint on state sovereignty,
and compel significant and undesirable democracy-reducing,
risk minimization behavior by all levels of government within
the NAFTA region .280
It might be questioned whether Justice Tysoe's ruling on
the transparency issue can be reconciled with his reluctance to
interfere with the Tribunal's rulings addressing the definition
and application of the concept of expropriation set out in Article
1110.281 In considering the apparent inconsistency between
these two holdings, it is important to appreciate the narrow ba-
sis on which Justice Tysoe determined he had grounds to set
aside the Tribunal's determination on the transparency issue
under Article 1105. As he emphasized, this was not merely a
case of a tribunal simply interpreting the wording of Article
1105 in a manner that he considered incorrect as a matter of
applicable customary international law.28 2 Had the error arisen
in this manner, Justice Tysoe was of the view that he would
have lacked jurisdiction, under the ICAA, to interfere with the
Tribunal's conclusion no matter how egregiously such a conclu-
sion conflicted with customary international law.28 3  What
vested him with authority to set aside the impugned ruling was
that the Tribunal incorrectly stated the applicable law to in-
clude NAFTA provisions outside of Chapter Eleven. 28 4 There-
fore, it was the Tribunal's invocation of the NAFTA preamble
and Chapter Eighteen in connection with its Article 1105 analy-
sis that made its ruling vulnerable to judicial review. 28 5 It was
on this basis that he concluded the Tribunal's ruling exceeded
the Parties' agreement on the submission to arbitrate as crystal-
lized in the architecture of NAFTA.28 6
Inherent in this proposition is an interesting corollary. On
this reasoning, the brief and cryptic nature of the Tribunal's
279. See Dhooge, supra note 6, at 269-70.
280. See Dhooge, supra note 6, at 263-73.
281. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
282. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 70 at 380.
283. Id. 69 at 380.
284. Id.
285. See id. 26 at 369, 72 at 380.
286. Id.
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reasons with respect to its interpretation of the concept of ex-
propriation paradoxically would appear to serve to insulate
these reasons from judicial review.2 7 Had the Tribunal referred
to NAFTA provisions outside of Chapter Eleven in support of its
interpretation of Article 1110, on Justice Tysoe's analysis, this
would vest a reviewing court with jurisdiction to consider and
set aside the decision of the Tribunal on the basis that it ex-
ceeded the Parties' submission to arbitrate. Where a tribunal
declines or omits to provide such authority, on this analysis, the
ambit of judicial review would be significantly constrained.
D. ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED: "ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE"
INVESTMENT, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GOVERNING LAW
As important as what Justice Tysoe's ruling decides is what
his ruling, and this litigation more generally, leaves unresolved.
In this category, three issues stand out: (1) the ability of NAFTA
Parties to insist that investments within their territories are
"undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental con-
cerns;" 28 8 (2) the responsibility of Parties for the actions of sub-
ordinate levels of government; and (3) the extent to which tribu-
nals should be entitled to determine matters of domestic law.
1. Environmentally Sensitive Investment
A key basis upon which Canada and, to a lesser extent,
Mexico challenged the decision of the Tribunal was its almost
complete failure to refer to the prominent role the NAFTA ar-
chitecture ostensibly gives to environmental protection and sus-
tainable development. Canada argued that the Tribunal gave
inappropriate weight to preambular language relating to the
goal of ensuring "a predictable commercial framework for busi-
ness planning and investment," ignoring the Parties' commit-
ment, also expressed in the preamble, to "promote sustainable
development" and to "strengthen the development and enforce-
ment of environmental laws and regulations."2 8 9 Moreover, Mex-
ico submitted that the Tribunal's analysis of the actions of the
Municipality and of the Ecological Decree failed to consider Ar-
287. See id. 77 at 381, IT 82-84 at 382-83.
288. See NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
289. See Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada I 34-
46 at 13-16, Metalclad (No. L002904); see also NAFTA, supra note 65, pmbl., 32
I.L.M. at 297.
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ticle 1114(1) of NAFTA, which purports to protect the right of a
Party to adopt, maintain, and enforce measures necessary to en-
sure that "investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to environmental concerns."290
Justice Tysoe did not address Canada's submissions and
dismissed Mexico's argument on the basis that the Tribunal's
failure to consider Article 1114(1) in its analysis of the Ecologi-
cal Decree was not "patently unreasonable. '291 While his treat-
ment of these submissions conforms with the conventionally ac-
cepted view of role to be adopted by a reviewing court, once
again, in this respect, the decision provides fodder for critics of
Chapter Eleven who will surely argue that the process unduly
insulates tribunals from accountability for ensuring the Chapter
is interpreted in a fashion that properly recognizes not only the
rights of investors, but also broader environmental and social
values. On the basis of Justice Tysoe's decision, it is now more
apparent than ever that the only viable means to ensure that
tribunals take such values into account is by means of an inter-
pretive statement of the type described earlier.292
2. State Responsibility
Another key issue that was addressed only peripherally in
the litigation is the vexed question of state responsibility. The
Tribunal dealt with this issue in a cursory manner. According
to the Tribunal, the question was disposed of by Mexico's con-
cession, in a pre-hearing submission, that it "was ... prepared
to proceed on the assumption that the normal rule of state re-
sponsibility applies; that is that [Mexico] can be internationally
responsible for the acts of state organs at all three levels of gov-
ernment."293 Nor is this an issue discussed in the reasons on ju-
dicial review, although the issue was directly raised in interve-
nor submissions. 294
Mexico's pre-hearing concession that, under customary in-
ternational law, a State may be held internationally responsible
for the acts of subordinate state governments begs a question
that neither the Tribunal nor Justice Tysoe addressed: in what
290. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument 435 at 132-33, Metalclad (No.
L002904); see also NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
291. See Metalclad, 89 B.C.L.R.3d 104 at 387.
292. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
293. See Award, supra note 3, 73 at 189.
294. Outline of Argument of Intervenor Province of Quebec at 2, United Mexican
States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.) (No. L002904).
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circumstances this liability should be deemed to arise. Under
customary international law, the doctrine has historically been
understood to deny a State the ability to seek immunity from
responsibility on the basis that subordinate levels of govern-
ment are independent or autonomous.2 95 But the question of in
what circumstances, under customary international law, the
acts of subordinate state organs should be legally attributed to a
central government is less clear. NAFTA addresses this very is-
sue by providing that Parties to the Agreement must ensure
"that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to
the provisions of this Agreement... except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Agreement, by state and provincial govern-
ments."296 NAFTA expressly provides that a reference to a state
or province includes local governments of that state or prov-
ince. 29
7
As intervenor, the Province of Quebec urged that when de-
termining whether state responsibility should be deemed to
arise under Chapter Eleven, a tribunal should first identify
what "necessary measures" should be required of a State to give
effect to the Agreement and then, having done so, the tribunal
should address the question of whether such necessary meas-
ures were in fact taken.298 Neither the reasons of the Tribunal
nor those of Justice Tysoe address the question of "necessary
measures."
Mexico, moreover, contended that the Tribunal erred by
295. See, e.g., the draft articles on state responsibility adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission of the United Nations in 1975 (as yet still being considered),
which states:
[t]he conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial government entity or of
an entity empowered to exercise elements of the Governmental authority,
such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be considered as an act of
the State under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ
exceeded its competence according to internal law or contravened instruc-
tions concerning its activity.
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1975, vol. II, at 61, cited in Award,
supra note 3, 73 at 189.
296. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. at 298 (emphasis added).
297. Id. art. 201(2), at 299. The analogous provision in the GATT obliges that
member states to take "such reasonable measures as may be available." General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 24(6), 61 Stat. A-11, A-66-67,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 272. As with the NAFTA provision, however, the
precise meaning and ambit of this provision as it applies to federal states where le-
gal authority is decentralized, as exists in Canada and Australia for instance, is un-
certain. Id.
298. Outline of Argument of Intervenor Province of Quebec at 5, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
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holding it liable, even though Metalclad had abandoned domes-
tic remedies aimed at challenging the Municipality's decision to
deny its facility a construction permit.299 According to Mexico,
Metalclad's failure to pursue its legal rights in the Mexican le-
gal system was relevant to the question of state responsibility.300
In its view, an investor has no valid claim against a State, in
circumstances in which it is impugning the actions of subordi-
nate governments, where there is no evidence that the State has
been derelict in its duty "for example, by failure to afford a rem-
edy, or by the removal of domestic remedies."30 1
While Mexico's submissions on this point were rendered
moot by Justice Tysoe's finding that the Tribunal had exceeded
its jurisdiction with respect to Article 1105, it might be argued
that the Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether Mexico
failed to take "all necessary measures" in response to the state
government's enactment of the Ecological Decree.
3. Governing Law
A final and related question that neither the Tribunal nor
Justice Tysoe addressed, and which is bound to figure promi-
nently in future Chapter Eleven litigation, concerns governing
law or lex arbitri.302 A key feature of proceedings before the Tri-
bunal was testimony by experts called by both sides with respect
to the legality of the Municipality's refusal to grant the con-
struction permit sought by COTERIN. 30 3 Ultimately, the Tribu-
nal sided with opinions offered by Metalclad's experts, namely
that the refusal was legally improper insofar as it was based on
grounds within the jurisdiction of the federal government. 30 4
Before Justice Tysoe, Mexico challenged not only this conclusion
but also the right of the Tribunal to reach this conclusion. Mex-
ico contended that the governing law for the purposes of Chap-
ter Eleven arbitrations is NAFTA and applicable rules of inter-
national law.30 5 This, it emphasized, distinguished Chapter
Eleven arbitral proceedings from private commercial arbitra-
299. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 287 at 88, Metalclad (No. L002904).
300. See id. 301 at 93.
301. See id.
302. See generally John Collier & Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in
International Law 229-232 (1999).
303. See Award, supra note 3, 79 at 190.
304. Id. 86 at 192.
305. NAFTA, supra note 65, art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645; see also Petitioner's
Outline of Argument 99-105 at 26-29, Metalclad (No. L002904).
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
tions conducted under the ICSID rules that vest tribunals with
jurisdiction to decide issues of domestic law.30 6 As noted earlier,
Mexico argued that the Tribunal ignored this jurisdictional limi-
tation and constituted itself as a Mexican appellate court em-
powered to decide issues of domestic law.307
In other Chapter Eleven litigation, tribunals have been re-
luctant to allow investors to expose to arbitral review domestic
judicial decisions. 308 Illustrative in this regard is the admoni-
tion of the Tribunal in Feldman v United Mexican States that
Chapter Eleven tribunals do "not have, in principle, jurisdiction
to decide upon claims arising because of an alleged violation
of... domestic Mexican law."30 9 Before Justice Tysoe, Metalclad
did not contest Mexico's assertion that the Tribunal lacked ju-
risdiction to determine questions of Mexican domestic law qua
law.310 However, Metalclad contended that the Tribunal em-
barked upon this inquiry in its "fact-finding" capacity, an in-
quiry necessitated by the fact that no Mexican court had ever
ruled on the key question of Municipal jurisdiction over con-
struction permits.31' In these circumstances, it could be argued
that the Tribunal had no option but to proceed to hear and as-
sess expert evidence on this point of law, given its relevance to
the dispute.312 However, to cloak Chapter Eleven tribunals with
even this limited "fact-finding" jurisdiction to interpret local
laws poses obvious dangers. As the International Court of Jus-
tice has observed: "[q]uestions relating to these matters are of
an extremely complicated and technical nature: they are highly
controversial and it is not easy to decide which solution is right
and which wrong .... [moreover] we cannot assert that incor-
rect decisions constitute in themselves a denial of justice and
306. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, art.
42(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
307. See Petitioner's Reply 116-120 at 30-31, Metalclad (No. L002904); Peti-
tioner's Outline of Argument 46 at 10-11, IT 280-283 at 85-86, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
308. See, e.g., Azinian et. al. v. United Mexican States, ISCID Case No.
ARB)AF)/97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537 (1999), cited in Petitioner's Outline of Argument [ 284
at 86-87, Metalclad (No. L002904) (holding court decision itself must constitute a
violation of the treaty).
309. Petitioner's Outline of Argument 286 at 88, Metalclad (No. L002904).
310. See Respondent's Outline of Argument 387 at 119, Metalclad (No.
L002904).
311. Id.
312. Indeed, during submissions by counsel for the Province of Quebec, Justice
Tysoe posed a question along precisely these lines. Outline of Argument of Interve-
nor Province of Quebec at 12, Metalclad (No. L002904).
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involve international responsibility."313
EPILOGUE
That both Mexico and Metalclad filed appeals from Justice
Tysoe's judgment suggests that neither side in this dispute be-
lieves that it has decisively prevailed in this precedent-setting
bitter legal battle. Yet for both parties, the prospect of the mat-
ter being considered afresh puts at risk the benefits that accrue
to them if the judgment stands. As such, the judgment has cre-
ated incentives for the parties to settle their dispute out of
court.314 Meanwhile, in a similar way, the Metalclad v. United
Mexican States litigation has seemingly succeeded in creating
the necessary incentives for NAFTA Parties to pay close, criti-
cal, and continuing attention to the Chapter Eleven process.
313. Separate opinion of Judge Tanaka, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited, 1970 I.C.J. 156.
314. On October 30, 2001, while this article was in publication, Mexico formally
abandoned its appeal. Notice of Abandonment of Appeal, at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Metal-appeal.pdf. Metalclad abandoned its cross-appeal. Notice
of Abandonment of Cross Appeal, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Metal-
cross-appeal.pdf.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol.11:183
Editor's Note
As The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompli-
ance and Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-
Border Services went to publication, President Bush signed the
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act of 2002 (Act). The Act was passed in response to the
decision by a NAFTA arbitral panel examining U.S. restrictions
on cross-border trucking with Mexico. The Panel held that the
United States violated its NAFTA obligations by restricting
trucking and allowed Mexico to levy trade sanctions in response.
Mr. Sheppard's article describes the complicated NAFTA truck-
ing debate and asserts that the principal arguments used by
those opposed to opening the border should not deter policy-
makers who would seek increased cross-border trucking.
The United States has enacted legislation that appears to
allow Mexican truck drivers access to U.S. highways in increas-
ing numbers. In fact, the stringent regulations embodied in the
Act are receiving a mixed reaction in both countries. The Act
places such heavy administrative regulations on border cross-
ings that the climate has remained hostile to Mexican trucking
operators. A brief description of the Act and its implications fol-
lows Mr. Sheppard's article. In Update: Department of Trans-
portation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Mr.
Price argues that many of the controversies that existed before
the Act passed remain significant obstacles to cross-border
trucking today.
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